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ABSTRACT 
The recent publication of IFRS 9 facilitates the use of hedge accounting, although some challenges arise 
as well. Hedge effectiveness is to be more align with risk management meaning that hedge accounting 
ineffectiveness will now be only related to factors such as counterparty credit risk whenever 
uncollateralized derivatives are to be used as hedge instruments. This master thesis is concerned with 
what may go wrong in a designated hedging relationship due to CVA and DVS volatility. Using Monte 
Carlo simulations and regression analysis the probability of hedging ineffectiveness as a function of 
probability of default perceived implied volatility is to be modelled. 
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RESUMO 
A recente publicação da IFRS 9 facilita o uso da contabilidade de cobertura, ainda que acrescente de 
igual modo alguns desafios. A contabilidade de cobertura passa a estar mais alinhada com a gestão de 
risco o que significa que a sua ineficácia passa a estar mais relacionada com fatores com risco de 
contraparte sempre que se usem derivados não coletaralizados como instrumentos de cobertura. Esta 
tese de mestrado foca-se no impacto da volatilidade do CVA/DVA na contabilidade de cobertura. 
Fazendo uso de simulações Montes Carlo e regressões estatísticas, procura-se modelizar a 
probabilidade de ineficácia das coberturas em função em da volatilidade das probabilidades de default. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The uncertain economic times of the past few years have had a major effect on how companies 
operate these days. Its impacts are observable in the increase of risk management professionals out 
there1 as well as in the number of companies using derivatives to manage market risk (thereby referred 
to as risk)2. When using the derivatives to manage risk, companies consider two main factors: the 
derivatives’ abilities to offset risks efficiently; and whether or not they are able to demonstrate to 
investors (trough the financial statements) their risk management activities.  
1.1. THE USE OF DERIVATIVES 
Derivatives are financial securities with a value that derived from an underlying asset or group of 
assets. The derivative itself is a contract between two or more parties, whose price is determined by 
fluctuations in the underlying asset. The most common underlying assets include stocks, bonds, 
commodities, currencies, interest rates and market indexes.  
Derivatives can either be traded over-the-counter (OTC) or on an exchange. OTC derivatives constitute 
the greater proportion of derivatives in existence and are unregulated, whereas derivatives traded on 
exchanges are standardized. OTC derivatives generally have greater risk for the counterparty than do 
standardized derivatives. 
According the statistics release ‘OTC derivatives statistics at end-June 2018’ published on 31st of 
October of 2018 by Bank of International Settlements, the “activity in OTC derivatives markets 
increased in the first half of 2018, driven mainly by short-term interest rate contracts”, with this 
increase in activity being driven largely by US dollar interest rate contracts. According to the same 
report, the notional amount of outstanding the OTC derivatives increased to $539 trillion at end-June 
2018 (6 times higher than the GWP3), reaching back the values of the beginning 2008. 
These figures are often used to illustrate how these contracts may present a significant risk to the 
global economy. Instead, the gross market value of outstanding derivatives contracts provides a more 
meaningful measure of amounts at risk. Its amount has been declining steadily since 2009 and is about 
to get below $10 trillion (11% of the GWP). 
This report further decomposes the current gross market value of outstanding derivatives into three 
risk categories: interest rate (64%), foreign exchange (25%) and credit derivatives (10%).  
Across the world, within non-financial firms 50% of them use derivatives in general, while 43% use 
currency derivatives and only 10% commodity price derivatives (Bartram, Brown, & Fehle, 2003). This 
suggests that the use of interest rate derivatives is mainly conducted by financial companies. 
                                                          
1 An EY report named ‘Rethinking risk management’ issued recently base on a survey of major financial 
institutions in the beginning of 2015 apprises that “64% [of the CROs] report increases in the size of the risk 
function over the past 12 months, and 60% expect such increases to continue next year”. 
2 According to an ISDA survey of derivatives usage by the world's 500 largest companies conducted in 
2009, “94% of these companies use derivative instruments to manage and hedge their business and financial 
risks” 
3 The GWP is the combined gross national product of all the countries in the world. As imports and exports 
offset when considering the whole world, this is the equivelent to world’s total global gross domestic product 
(GDP). 
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As to what the interest rate derivatives market is concerned, the Swaps represent 89% of the market 
value of OTC interest rate derivatives, followed by FRAs (10%). 
All these figures suggest that derivatives markets have been exceptionally successful. The main reason 
is that they have involved many different types of traders and have a great deal of liquidity. When an 
investor wants to take one side of a deal, there is usually no problem in finding someone who is 
prepared to take the other side. Three wide groups of traders can be identified: hedgers, speculators, 
and arbitrageurs (Hull, 2015). 
Hedgers use derivatives to reduce the risk that they face from possible future movements in a market 
variable. Speculators use them to gamble on the future direction of a market variable. Arbitrageurs 
take offsetting positions in two or more instruments to lock in a return. 
In the literature, research on risk management in the late 90s focused on the question of why firms 
should hedge a given risk (Petersen & Thiagarajan, 2000). This literature makes the point that 
measuring risk exposures is an essential component of a firm’s risk management strategy. This 
measuring, within the most recent accounting standards, tend sto be translated on the firms’ 
financials. 
More recent literature suggests the managers’ concern with the financial accounting of their risk 
management activities is positive for investors as firm’s abilities to meet earning targets are positively 
associated with the likelihood that firms will focus on accounting earnings rather than economic 
earnings (Hughen, 2010) 
From the risk management point of view, the most important thing in the financials is not only how 
the financal instruments are recognized but also how the financial statements reflect their hedging 
practices. Hedge accounting is therefore of great importance. 
1.2. HEDGE ACCOUNTING STANDARDS 
Hedge accounting is the accountancy practice that allows a company to offset to the mark-to-market 
movement of the derivative in the P&L account of the instrument (risk) being hedged. As hedge 
accounting entails much compliance – involving documenting the hedge relationship and 
demonstrating the hedge relationship is effective – the implementation of a recencly published hedge 
accounting stantard poses some challenges to risk managers. This new guidance (IFRS 9) has been 
recently finalised by IASB (International Accounting Standards Board), which is the independent 
accounting standard-setting body of the IFRS Foundation founded in 2001, as the successor to the 
International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC). It is responsible for developing International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), previously known as International Accounting Standards (IAS) 
and promoting the use and application of these standards. 
In terms of hedge accounting, the new requirements introduced in IFRS 9 (also refered to as the 
Standard) were, in some extent, a response to criticism of IAS 39 which was often viewed as too 
stringent and not capable of reflecting risk managagement principles. Theese changes aim to reduce 
accounting earnings volatility by representing, in the financial statements, the effect of an entity’s risk 
management activities that use financial instruments to manage exposures arising from particular risks 
that could affect profit or loss (IFRS 9 - par. 6.1.1) 
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The principal of economic relationship between the hedged item and the hedging instrument has 
therefore been introduced (IFRS 9 - par. 6.4.1.c). Henceforward hedge accounting converges with 
economic hedging, although that is so just as long as the effect of credit risk does not dominate the 
value changes that result from that economic relationship. 
Because the hedge accounting model is based on a general notion of offset between gains and losses 
on the hedging instrument and the hedged item, hedge effectiveness is determined not only by the 
economic relationship between those items (ie the changes in their underlyings) but also by the effect 
of credit risk on the value of both the hedging instrument and the hedged item (IFRS 9 - par. B6.4.7). 
An example of credit risk dominating a hedging relationship may be when an entity hedges an exposure 
to certain risk using an uncollateralised derivative. If the counterparty to that derivative experiences a 
severe deterioration in its credit standing, the effect of the changes in the counterparty’s credit 
standing might outweight the effect of changes on the fair value of the hedging instrument. In such a 
case the hedging relationship would turn out to became innefective and hedge accounting should be 
discountinued. This, therefore, poses a risk of hedge accounting being discountinued whenever the 
hedging instrument consists of an uncollateralized OTC derivative. 
1.3. THE IMPORTANCE OF HEDGE ACCOUNTING 
For businesses that use derivatives for risk management, failure to qualify for hedge accounting may 
induce income volatility that does not accurately reflect underlying economic performance. This 
income volatility can have a substantial impact on other managerial decisions and contractual 
obligations faced by the company, which may influence the choice of hedging instrument or even 
whether to hedge at all. 
Franklin Savings and Loan is an extreme example of the consequences of income volatility resulting 
from failure to qualify for hedge accounting. In 1990, Franklin experienced losses on a hedging 
instrument they claimed would be offset by subsequent expected gains in their business. Although 
they documented their anticipation of hedge effectiveness, no hedge accounting treatment was 
undertaken. This resulted in income statement volatility that triggered debt covenants that later 
reduced the firm’s equity below minimum capitalization requirements and ultimately resulting in its 
demise 
One, therefore, ought to properly account for hedging relationships in the financial statements and 
furthermore assess properly the probability of a hedging to become ineffective. 
1.4. IFRS 9 
This Standard is to be applied by all entities preparing IFRS financial information and to almost all types 
of financial instruments. IFRS 9 is effective for annual periods beginning on or after 1 January 2018, 
with earlier application permitted.  
IFRS 9 is one of the most significant financial reporting developments in recent years and its 
implications could be wide ranging, affecting business strategies, processes, systems, controls, 
financial statement preparation and disclosures. Although IFRS 9 applies to all entities, financial 
institutions and other entities, with large portfolios of financial assets measured at Amortized Cost 
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(AC) or Fair Value through Other Comprehensive Income (FVOCI) under IAS 39 will be most significantly 
affected, particularly by: 
 the new classification and measurement requirements; 
 the change to the Expected Credit Loss (ECL) model introduced by IFRS 9; and  
 the hedge accounting requirements 
 
Under the new standard, the core principles of hedge accounting have not changed significantly from 
IAS 39, with IFRS 9 still requiring all hedges to be formally designated and documented at inception. 
There are still 3 types of hedging relationships: fair value hedge; cash flow hedge; and hedge of a net 
investment in a foreign operation (IFRS 9 - par. 6.5.2).  
The focus of this dissertation is fair value hedge which IFRS 9 defines as “a hedge of the exposure to 
changes in fair value of recognized asset or liability or an unrecognized firm commitment, or a 
component of any such item, that is attributable to a particular risk and could affect profit or loss” 
(IFRS 9 - par. 6.5.2). In practice, it means that the fair value hedge is a hedge of the risk that the hedge 
item’s fair value will change in response to variables such as interest rates, foreign exchange rates or 
market prices. An example is an IRS, which converts fixed rate debt into floating rate debt. 
In fact, as the main players in derivatives markets are financial institutions, the main risk they want 
hedge is the interest rate risk. Hence, fair value hedge is often done by these participants to switch 
their fixed income or cost structures in variable ones, which reflect the better their funding costs. 
As mentioned before, the derivatives may be contracted either within the OTC market or through CCP4. 
While derivatives in CPPs tend to be collateralized, the ones contracted within OTC markets may not 
be. When there is not collateral, counterparty credit risk arises, which may affect the hedge accounting 
effectiveness. One of the main IFRS 9 requirements hedge effectiveness is therefore that the effect of 
credit risk does not dominate the value changes that result from the economic relationship between 
the hedged item and the hedging instrument (IFRS 9 - par. 6.4.1). 
The effect of credit risk means that even if there is an economic relationship between the hedging 
instrument and the hedged item, the level of offset might become unreliable. This may arise from an 
alteration in the credit risk of either the hedging instrument or the hedged item.  
An example of credit risk dominating a hedging relationship is when an entity hedges an exposure to 
bond’s interest rate risk using an uncollateralised derivative. If the counterparty to that derivative 
experiences a severe deterioration in its credit quality, the effect of the changes in the counterparty’s 
credit standing might outweigh the effect of changes in the bond’s price, given that changes in the 
value of the hedged item depend largely on the interest rate changes. 
The credit standing of a company is not static. Instead, credit risk is driven both by idiosyncratic firm 
characteristics and by systematic factors is an important issue for the assessment of financial stability 
(Bonfim, 2009). These results in uncertainty, reason why credit risk volatile. At the same time the fact 
                                                          
4 A central counterparty clearing house (CCP) is an organization that exists in various countries to facilitate 
trading done in the derivatives and equities markets. These clearing houses are often operated by the major 
banks to provide efficiency and stability to the financial markets in which they operate. CCPs bear most of the 
credit risk of buyers and sellers when clearing and settling market transactions. 
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the credit risk also depends on macroeconomics developments, for instance, illustrate that up to some 
extent credit risk between two companies may be correlated as well. 
This suggests that even if, in one hand, the higher the volatilities of credit risk the higher the probability 
of hedge accounting ineffectiveness, on the other hand, the significant correlation between the credit 
risk may outcome the volatility effect on the hedge ineffectiveness. 
In this thesis we analyse whether a given accounting hedging a relationship is going to be effective. 
Our goal is to demonstrate that increased volatility of perceived counterparty credit risk increases the 
odds that an hedging accounting relationship turns out to be effective. Additionally, we aim to  
corroborate the hypothesis that the higher the correlation of perceived counterparty credit risk the 
lower the probabilities of an accounting hedging relationship to turn out to be effective. 
In order to do so we explore the financial information available within the Portuguese stock market, 
by setting up a hypothetical uncollateralized IRS between BPI and BCP and then corroborate each of 
the above mentioned hypothesis. In setting up an IRS, we explain the contractual characteristics of an 
hypothetical contact and discuss its valuation methodology. To predict hedge accounting 
effectiveness, we adopt a classical Black-Scholes framework and test for the impact of PDs volatilities 
and cross-correlation on hedge effectiveness. As the hedging innefectiveness may arise from both CVA 
and DVA fluctuations, this thesis uses a bilateral CVA approach in order to account for credit risk. 
In the thesis we recognize that hedge accounting ineffectiveness does not depend solely on factors 
such as the volatility of the PDs and its correlation. To test the hypothesis that BPI and BCP hypothetical 
IRS is affected by other factors, a parallel approach is tested in which we analyse the sensitivity of 
hedge effectiveness to changes in the PDs, LGDs and interest rates. 
This thesis is organized as follows. First the author has conducted a LITERATURE REVIEW on three main 
research topics: valuation of IRS; accounting for the CVA/DVA adjustments; estimating the default 
probabilities. Then, on the METHODOLOGY, based on the literature, the author explores in what extent 
the hedge accounting practices may be affected by both the volatility of the perceived counterparty 
credit risk and the correlation of the of fluctuations in the credit risk of the counterparties, when using 
an uncollateralized IRS (Interest Rate Swap) to hedge against interest rate risk. Having gone trough the 
main the qualitative and quantitative research assumptions, the results are shown in the RESULTS AND 
DISCUSSION section. Finnaly, having the results been interpreted, the author concludes. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. HEDGE ACCOUNTING 
Up to the nineties risk management had received little attention by economists. That has changed with 
growth of over the counter derivatives occurred in this decade as managers started to use these 
instruments for financial hedging with DeMarzo & Duffie (1995) demonstrating that managers often 
hedge accounting risk as opposed to, or in addition to, economic risk. 
Notwithstanding, later on, based on the hedge accounting methods prescribed by SFAS No. 1335, which 
introduced the concepts of “fair-value” and “cash-flow” hedge accounting methods, it is demonstrated 
that under no-hedge accounting at all, the hedge choice would still be different from the optimal 
economic hedge (Melumad, Weyns, & Ziv, 1999). At that time the research focused on the 
documentation of hedging effectiveness proposed correlation coefficients and several other non-
regression-based effectiveness-testing methodologies (Kawaller & Koch, 2000). 
The use of correlation coefficients is of major importance as it allows to demonstrate that a hedge is 
expected to be effective in the future (at least, based on historical date). In 2003, Lopes & Santos 
demonstrate how regulators were late in recognizing methodologies such as the one proposed 
Kawaller & Koch (2000) to oversee the use of hedge accounting effectiveness. Their work also showed 
how the absence of such methodologies in the hedge accounting documentations made the hedge 
accounting vulnerable to manipulations. 
Notwithstanding, the growth of the recognition of hedge accounting had already started. Research 
conducted on the NYSE listed companies show that the more the duration of a company’s debt the 
more they made use of hedge accounting (Galdi & Guerra, 2009). 
Although the use of hedge accounting is related directly to the extent in which a company uses 
derivatives to manage their risk, the hedging behaviour in corporations is associated with frequency 
of derivatives usage, IFRS experience, perceived importance of reduced earnings volatility and low 
growth opportunities, with more than half of the companies using hedge accounting indicate that the 
accounting rules influence their hedging behaviour (Glaum & Klocker, 2011). 
As the ability of companies to undertake hedge accounting and document it increased so did concern 
of regulators. The hedging documentation started to be challenged more often. One of the main 
concerns of regulators and auditors started to be how credit risk of uncollateralized derivatives 
counterparties could affect economic and hedge accounting effectiveness 
2.2. RISK MANAGEMENT AFTER DE 2007 CREDIT CRISIS 
The critical role of the mortgage market in triggering the recent global financial crisis has led to a surge 
in policy interest, bank regulation and academic research in this area. Encouraged by regulators, banks 
now devote significant resources in developing internal credit risk models to better quantify expected 
credit losses and to assign the mandatory economic capital. Rigorous credit risk analysis is not only of 
                                                          
5 SFAS No. 133, Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities is an accounting standard 
issued in June 1998 by the FASB that, in response to significant hedging losses involving derivatives years ago, 
started to require companies to measure all assets and liabilities on their balance sheet at “fair value”. 
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significance to lenders and banks, but is also of paramount importance for sound economic policy 
making and regulation as it provides a good check on the “health” of a financial system and at large, 
the course of the economy (Chamboko & Bravo, 2016, 2018a,b,c). 
In fact, credit risk has only become a topical issue since the 2007 Credit Crisis with the main approaches 
to credit risk modelling only starting to be consolidated in the upcoming years. Credit Valuation 
Adjustments for pricing derivatives contracts were stepping and, subsequently researchers started to 
take a closer look at stochastic default rate models (Finger, 2000) previously made public. Three of 
these models (CreditMetrics, CreditRisk+, and CreditPortfolio) had been introduced by Wilson (1998). 
It impresses how the state of the credit risk measurement has progressed in the two years after the 
financial crises. Many of the models have entered their second generation. A consensus has developed 
about certain model parameters and methodologies. Two schools of thought have emerged. One 
“school” followed the intellectual heritages of Merton’s options theoretical approach and explains 
default in structural terms related to the market value of the firm’s assets as compared to its debt 
obligations. Another “reduced form school” statistically decomposed observed risky debt prices into 
default risk premiums without necessarily scrutinizing their underlying causalities. Under these 
circumstances, Sanders & Allen (2010) have tried to cope with the economic intuition of each of the 
models accurately. 
Consequently, Enterprise risk management (ERM) started to be a topic of increased media attention, 
with this being the key motivation for Hoyt & Liebenberg (2011) to measure the extent to which 
specific firms had implemented ERM programs and, then, to assess the value implications of these 
programs. These authors found a positive relationship between firm value and the use of ERM. 
A similar approach has been taken later on by Aebi, Sabato, & Schmid (2012). This time authors focused 
on the banking industry, by investigating whether risk management-related corporate governance 
tools, such as for example the attendance of a chief risk officer (CRO) in a bank’s executive board and 
whether the CRO reported to the CEO or directly to the board of directors, were associated with a 
better bank performance during the financial crisis of 2007/2008. The results indicate that banks, in 
which the CRO directly reported to the board of directors and not to the CEO (or other corporate 
entities), displayed significantly higher stock returns and ROE during the crisis. 
By 2013, the question was not anymore whether financial services companies should have the ERM 
functions, but rather how to have high-quality ERM programs. Using ERM quality ratings of financial 
companies by Standard & Poor's (S&P)6, Baxter, Bedard, Hoitash, & Yezegel found that higher ERM 
quality is associated less resource constraint and better corporate governance. They also found that 
higher ERM quality is associated with improved accounting performance. 
                                                          
6 S&P Global Ratings' ERM assessment centers on the following five key areas: risk governance; 
operational risk; market risk; credit risk; and liquidity and funding. As to what the credit risk component of the 
ERM evaluation structure, is concerned, S&P looks at how an institution's underwriting practices are linked to its 
credit risk appetite, as well as the robustness of the techniques used in monitoring and managing its credit 
portfolio. 
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The quest for a proper ERM continues and the attentions start to shift to the operation aspects of ERM. 
Concepts such has Risk Analytics, Data and Technology and Dashboard Reporting are start to be 
assessed (Lam, 2014). 
In these years, it has been demonstrated how the ERM programs were important, for the firms who 
had it, to go through the financial crisis. After companies started to create their ERM programs, the 
focus started to be their quality and proper reporting tools. As ERM becomes more mature, research 
is focusing on the quantitative questions rather than qualitative ones. In 2015, McNeil, Frey, & 
Embrechts’s work got a lot of attention has their book revises all the advances made in the past years 
in quantitative risk management. After revising the history of ERM, the authors introduce the basic risk 
management concepts. Then the readers are provide with an overview with the statistival properties 
of financial data and its aplications to market and credit risk. The last chapter is dedicated to the 
dynamic credit risk models, revising concepts such as uncolleteralized value adjustments. 
2.3. CREDIT RISK MEASUREMENT BASIC APPROACHES AND VALUE ADJUSTMENTS 
2.3.1. Market-based estimation of default probabilities 
Estimating default probabilities, however, could be challenging due to limitations on data availability. 
Still, there are a number of techniques that allows one to overcome these limitations. These techniques 
can either be market-based (which rely on security prices and ratings) or fundamental-based (which 
rely on financial statement data and/or systematic market and economic factors). 
Market-based techniques can be applied whenever there is a relatively liquid secondary market for 
securities issued by, or credit derivatives referencing, the obligor or entity of interest. Under the 
assumption of market efficiency, securities and credit derivatives prices are forward-looking and 
capture all publicly available information on the default risk of an obligor. Based on these market prices 
obligor’s default probability may be inferred. Three main instruments may then be used: 
1. Credit Default Swaps 
2. Bonds 
3. Equity Prices 
 
2.3.1.1. Credit default swaps 
Credit default swaps (CDSs) are the most liquid credit derivatives contracts. These contracts are the 
equivalent to insurance against default. The buyer of the CDS pays a regular fee or CDS spread, in 
exchange for protection against the default of a reference obligor during the life of the derivative. If 
the obligor defaults, the buyer delivers the bond or loan of the reference obligor to the protection 
seller in exchange for the face value of the bond or loan. CDS contracts are widely available worldwide. 
The contract maturity usually ranges from 1 to 10 years. Clearly, the CDS spread price depends heavily 
on the default probability of the reference obligor, a fact exploited by (Chan-Lau, 2003) and for 
predicting sovereign defaults, using credit default swap spreads. 
This dependence is illustrated in the next example. Assuming a one-period CDS contract with a unit 
notional amount. The protection seller is exposed to an expected loss, 𝐿, equal to 
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𝐿 = 𝑝(1 − 𝑅𝑅) (1) 
where 𝑝 is the default probability, and 𝑅𝑅 is the expected recovery rate at default. The 𝑅𝑅 and default 
probability are assumed to be independent. In the absence of market frictions, fair pricing arguments 
and risk neutrality imply that the CDS spread, 𝑆, should be equal to the present value of the expected 
loss: 
𝑆 =
𝑝(1 − 𝑅𝑅)
1 + 𝑟
 
(2) 
where 𝑟 is the risk free interest rate. The default probability can then be recovered from (2) if the 𝑅𝑅, 
the 𝑆, and 𝑟 are known. This is so as long as CDSs are liquid, which in general is only true for sovereign 
bonds and corporationes with a significant market capitalization. 
2.3.1.2. Bonds  
Bond prices also provide information about default probabilities as illustrated in the next one-period 
example. Assuming a zero-coupon bond paying one unit of value at maturity. The probability of default 
of the bond is 𝑝, the fixed recovery rate is 𝑅𝑅, and the risk-free discount rate is 𝑟. If the bond is 
currently valued at 𝐵, risk neutrality implies: 
𝐵 =
(1 − 𝑝) + 𝑝𝑅𝑅
1 + 𝑟
 
(3) 
Equation (3) can be solved for 𝑝 as a function of the recovery rate, the risk-free discount rate, and the 
price of the bond: 
𝑝 =
1 − (1 − 𝑟) + 𝐵
1 − 𝑅𝑅
 
(4) 
Fons (1987) have generalized the intuition derived from the previous example, by presenting an 
introduction to risk-neutral models of risky-bond pricing. In this article, the relationship between the 
default premiums embodied in bond yields and actual default rates is also examined. 
2.3.1.3. Equity prices 
The first to draw attention to the insight that corporate securities could be seen as contingent claims 
on the asset value of the issuing firm were Black & Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974). This insight is 
illustrated in the case of a firm issuing one unit of equity and one unit of a zerocoupon bond with face 
value 𝐷 and maturity 𝑇. At expiration, the value of debt, 𝐵𝑇, and equity, 𝐸𝑇, are given by: 
𝐵𝑇 = min(𝑉𝑇 , 𝐷) = 𝐷 −max⁡(𝐷 − 𝑉𝑇; 0) (5) 
𝐸𝑇 = max⁡(𝑉𝑇 − 𝐷; 0) (6) 
where 𝑉𝑇 is the asset value of the firm at expiration. The interpretation of equations (5) and (6) is 
simple. Bondholders only get paid if the firm’s assets exceed the face value of debt. Otherwise, the 
firm is liquidated and assets are used to partially compensate them. Equity holders, thus, are residual 
claimants in the firm since they only are paid subsequently to bondholders. By taking a closer look at 
these equations one notes that they correspond to the payoff of European options. The first equation 
states that the 𝐵𝑇 corresponds to a long position on a risk-free bond and a short position on a put 
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option with strike price equal to the 𝐷. The second equation states that 𝐸𝑇 is equivalent to a long 
position on a call option with strike price equal to 𝐷. Given the assumptions of the Black-Scholes option 
pricing formulas, the default probability in period 𝑡 for a horizon of 𝑇 years can be seen as 
𝑝𝑡 = 𝑁 [−
𝑙𝑛
𝑉𝑡
𝐷 + (𝑟 −
𝜎𝐴
2
2 )𝑇
𝜎𝐴√𝑇
] 
(7) 
where 𝑁 is the cumulative normal distribution, 𝑉𝑡 is the value of assets in period 𝑡, 𝑟 is the risk-free 
rate, and 𝜎𝐴 is the asset volatility. 
The numerator in equation (7) is referred to as distance-to-default. Empirical results by Moody’s KMV 
have shown that distance-to-default does a good job in predicting corporate defaults. Furthermore, 
work by Gropp, Vesala, & Vulpes (2002) and Lau-Chan, Arnaud, & Kong (2004) showed that it predicts 
as well banks’ downgrades in developed and emerging market countries. 
Due to public information availability, this is PD estimation method to be considered in this thesis. 
2.3.2. XVAs family 
Historically OTC derivatives pricing has relied solely on risk neutral pricing methods, not taking into 
consideration factors such as credit risk, funding costs of collaterals, adjustments regarding the 
implication of the derivatives in regaluatory capital and so on. After the 2008 financial crisis the XVA 
family started to take shape. The XVAs are a family of adjustments that may be made to the valuation 
of derivatives, reflecting things such as: 
1. Counterparty risk (CVA); 
2. Own-default risk (DVA); 
3. Funding costs (FVA); 
4. Margin requirements (MVA); 
5. Capital requirements (KVA), and 
 
Their definitions and estimation methods are still debated, but in general nowadays entities that 
ignore XVAs are at risk of mispricing a derivative. One may found further literature regarding the first 
three valuation adjustments in the subsections below. 
2.3.2.1. CVA and DVA 
CVA (and DVA) is the difference between the price of a derivative with default risk free counterparties 
and that with default risky counterparties. CVA therefore ends up being an adjustment in a valuation 
due to one of the two parties being considered default risky. From the point of view an entity, the 
default risk of a counterparty leads to the entity to charge the counterparty a risk premium (unilateral 
CVA). As usually both counterparties are default risky this risk premium may change signs depending 
on the relative riskiness of the two (bilateral CVA). The dynamics of change in sign of the net of CVD 
and DVA is explored by Brigo (2009). 
As the hedging innefectiveness may arise from both CVA and DVA fluctuations, this thesis is going to 
make use of the bilateral CVA approach in order to account for credit risk. 
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2.3.2.2. FVA 
The impact of collateralization on default risk and on CVA and DVA has been addressed in Cherubini 
(2005) and particularly in Brigo, Capponi, Pallavicini, & Papatheodorou (2011). These works look at 
CVA and DVA gap risk under several collateralization strategies as a function of the margining 
frequency. 
Using this approach would imply the author to take several assumptions on margin requirments and 
on margin frequency. For that reason, valuation adjustments other than CVA and DVA are not to be 
take into consideration. 
2.4. OTHER RESEARCH 
In order to go deeper in the research topics to be used in the METHODOLOGY, the author has further 
focused its literature review on the following areas: 
1. Cash flows projection and discounting; 
2. Stochastic processes. 
 
The literature review on this topics aims focus on the foundations of the stat of art research rather 
than on the lastest works, as the approach to be conducted by the author further on is to be a simplified 
one. 
2.4.1. Cash flows projection and discounting 
There are two main approaches to be considered when valuing an IRS. In the 2.1.1. Single Curve 
Discounting, the main assumption is that the underlying reference floating rate is risk free. Before the 
financial crisis, the market generally accepted reference interest rates such as Libor or Euribor as risk 
free, thus using this reference rates to discount cash-flows. However, after the financial crisis, these 
rates are no longer considered to be risk free. As a significant spread between these reference rates 
and the OIS rates may exist, the markets started to use the 2.1.2 Dual Curve Discounting. 
2.4.1.1. Single Curve Discounting 
Under this approach one starts from the valuation of FRAs, based on the reference rates. From these 
one may infer the expected payments of each cash flow of a given IRS and then discount to get their 
present value. In order to obtain the discount factors for long tenors, one turns to the market swap 
rates of new IRS contracts. Whenever it is needed one uses the bootstrapping method to infer some 
interest rates. In this framework, the reference rate is assumed to be risk free, and is the only floating 
rate involved. In the following context, we refer to this method as the single curve discounting method. 
This, as explained in the in the following subsection, is going to be the method adopted in this thesis. 
2.4.1.2. Dual Curve Discounting 
To address the limitations that arise from the fact that the reference rates don’t reflect the risk-free 
rates, the market has moved to a dual curve discounting approach, which projects the cash flows linked 
to the reference rates (by using valuation the FRAs in the same way) but then discounts them by the 
risk free rate (Siliadin, 2013). Essentially, the dual curve discounting approach takes into consideration 
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the credit and liquidity risks of the financial institutions participating in the generation of the reference 
interest rates. 
Although the author believes that, as pointed out by Siliadin (2013), dual curve discounting method is 
the appropriate one to be use, for the purpose of this thesis the method to be used is going to be the 
first one due to lack of public available data on OIS discount rates. 
2.4.2. Stochastic processes 
A stochastic process is a mathematical object usually defined as a collection of random variables. These 
may be associated with points in time, giving the interpretation of a stochastic process representing 
numerical values randomly changing over time. Based on their mathematical properties, stochastic 
processes may be categorized (for example) as: 
1. Bernoulli process; 
2. Random walk; 
3. Wiener process; and 
4. Poisson process. 
2.4.2.1. Bernoulli Process 
A Bernoulli process is a sequence of binary random variables, so it is a discrete-time stochastic process 
that takes only two values, usually 0 and 1. The component Bernoulli variables 𝑋𝑖  are identically 
distributed and independent. A common example of a Bernoulli process is a flipping repeatedly a coin. 
Every variable 𝑋𝑖  in the sequence is associated with a Bernoulli trial or experiment. They all have the 
same distribution. The Bernoulli process can also be generalized to more than two outcomes (such as 
the process for a dice). This generalization is called a Bernoulli scheme. One possible utility of the 
Bernoulli process may be assessing whether or not a coin is fair. 
This process might be used for several purposes such as estimate a certain probability of HIV 
transmission each time a susceptible person has unprotected sex or engages in other HIV-risk 
behaviours (Pinkerton & Abramson, 1993) or to estimate the probability of an uncolleteralized hedging 
relationship being effective by running a set of Monte Carlo Simulation. 
2.4.2.2. Random Walk 
A random walk is a mathematical object that describes a path of a succession of random steps on some 
mathematical space. An example of a random walk is the random walk of a probability of default, 
which starts at 50% and at each step moves +1 p.p. or −1 p.p. with a given probability. Other examples 
include the FSLI of companies even though they may not be truly random in reality. Random walks 
have applications to many scientific fields other than Finance, including ecology, psychology, computer 
science, physics, chemistry, biology as well as economics. Random walks explain the observed 
behaviours of many processes in these fields, and thus may be used as a model for the recorded 
stochastic activities. As a more mathematical application, the value of π can be approximated by the 
usage of random walk in agent-based modelling environment. The term random walk was first 
introduced by Karl Pearson (1905). 
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2.4.2.3. Wiener Process 
In contrast to the Bernoulli Process and Random Walk, the Wiener process is a continuous-time 
stochastic process, named in honour of Norbert Wiener. It is often called Brownian motion due to its 
historical connection with the physical process known as Brownian motion originally observed by 
Robert Brown. It occurs frequently in pure and applied mathematics, economics, quantitative finance, 
evolutionary biology, and physics. 
The Wiener process has applications throughout the mathematical sciences. In physics it is used to 
study the diffusion of minute particles suspended in fluid, and other types of diffusions, such as 
materials and components degradation (Whitmore, 1995). It also forms the basis for the path 
formulation of quantum mechanics and the study of eternal inflation in physical cosmology. It is also 
prominent in the mathematical theory of finance, in particular the Black-Scholes option pricing model 
(see EQUITY PRICES). 
2.4.2.4. Poisson Process 
In statistics, probability and other fields, a Poisson process is a type of random mathematical object 
that consists of points randomly located on a mathematical space. This process has convenient 
mathematical properties, which has led to being used as a mathematical model for random processes 
in numerous disciplines such as astronomy, physics, economics, and image processing and quantum 
physics as in (Nualar & Vives, 1990). 
In this thesis, the Wiener Process is to be used to model the fluctuations of the FSLI of the companies 
engaged in IRS. Based on those moves it is going to be assessed the probability of hedge accounting to 
become ineffective through the Bernoulli Process of running Monte Carlo Simulations. 
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3. METHODOLOGY 
In this section the author starts by setting the goals of the methodological approach to be followed. In 
each subsection the review of the methodology is accompanied with mentions of the literature review 
and the statistical concepts to be used as in LITERATURE REVIEW. In each subsection the reader is 
provided as well with the subsections of RESULTS AND DISCUSSION where the outputs of these 
methodological approaches are going to be analysed in interpreted. 
The main goals of this thesis are to: 
(i) come up with a way to predict whether a given accounting hedging a relationship is going 
to be effectiveness; 
(ii) to demonstrate the higher the volatilities of perceived counterparty credit risk the higher 
the odds of an accounting hedging relationship to turn out to be effective; and 
(iii) to corroborate the hypothesis that the higher the correlation of perceived counterparty 
credit risk the lower the probabilities of an accounting hedging relationship to turn out to 
be effective. 
 
In order to do so the author is going to explore the financial information available within the 
Portuguese stock market, by setting up an hypothetical uncollateralized IRS between BPI and BCP and 
then corroborate each of the above mentioned hypothesis. In SETTING UP AN IRS it is explained the 
contractual characteristics of an hypothetical IRS to be set up as well as how it is going to be priced. 
Later it is going to be explained, in PREDICTING HEDGE ACCOUNTING EFFECTIVENESS, the methodology 
under which one could have estimated the probability of the hedge accounting (implied in the IRS set-
up) to become inefective. Then, THE IMPACT OF PDS VOLATILITIES AND CROSS-CORRELATION ON HEDGE 
EFFECTIVENESS,  it is going to be assessed how the volatility of the PDs and their cross-correlation affect 
the hedge effectiveness. 
The author recognizes that hedge accounting ineffectiveness does not depend solely on factors such 
as the volatility of the PDs and its correlation. Therefore, in order to access in what extent the work 
done on the BPI and BCP hypothetical IRS is affected by other factors, a parallel approach is going to 
be considered in GENERIC APPROACH. This approach aims to be as much generic as possible, by looking 
at the response of the hedge inefectiveness for a similar contract but with different PDs, LGDs and 
interest rates. Its results are interpreted in GENERIC APPROACH. In the same to subsection its 
applicability to the BCP and BPI interest rate swap is going to be checked. 
3.1. SETTING UP AN IRS 
An interest rate swap (IRS) is an agreement, often done in OTC market, between two companies in 
which one company agrees to pay to another company cash flows equal to interest at a predetermined 
fixed rate on a notional principal for a predetermined number of years. In return, it receives interest 
at a floating rate on the same notional principal for the same period of time from the other company. 
If one assumes that principal payments are both received and paid at the end of the swap without 
changing its value, from the point of view of the floating-rate payer a swap can be regarded as a long 
position in a fixed-rate bond and a short position in a floating-rate bond, so that 
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𝑉𝑠𝑤𝑎𝑝 = 𝐵𝑓𝑖𝑥 − 𝐵𝑓𝑙  (8) 
where 𝑉𝑠𝑤𝑎𝑝 is the value of the swap (assuming no default), 𝐵𝑓𝑙  is the value of the floating-rate bond 
(corresponding to payments that are made), and 𝐵𝑓𝑖𝑥  is the value of the fixed-rate bond 
(corresponding to payments that are received). 
This being so, assuming the floating rate is the Euribor – daily reference rate, published by the 
European Money Markets Institute, based on the averaged interest rates at which Eurozone banks 
offer to lend unsecured funds to other banks in the euro wholesale money market (or interbank 
market) – for a 5-years IRS contracted at the 1st of January 2010 the fixed rate received annually would 
be 2,15% (see TABLE 6-1 - Year-end AAA rated bonds interest rates according to ECB). In this thesis, due 
to lack data availability regarding the swap curve, it will be assumed to be matching hat of interest 
rates paid by AAA rated bonds within the Eurozone, as reported by the ECB. This is reasonable 
assumption as the Euribor is often regarded as risk-free rate. 
The future cash flows can then be estimated from the implied forward rates as follows: 
𝑓𝑚1 =
(1 + 𝑧𝑚+1)
𝑚+1
(1 + 𝑧𝑚)𝑚
− 1 
(9) 
being 𝑓𝑚1  the expected one 1-period forward rate at the 𝑚
th period, 𝑧𝑚 the spot rate for the 𝑚
th 
period as well. See the complete stream of cash flows in the table below: 
Table 3-1 - Expected Cash-Flows as of the begenning of 2010 
Interes Rates 2011 2012 2012 2012 2012 
Variable Forward 0,6% 1,3% 2,2% 3,0% 3,7% 
Fixed 2,2% 2,2% 2,2% 2,2% 2,2% 
Source: author’s calculations on the information provided by BCE 
By discounting each estimated future cash flow TABLE 3-1 - Expected Cash-Flows as of the begenning 
of 2010 to the its present value based on the interest rates on TABLE 6-1 - Year-end AAA rated bonds 
interest rates according to ECB one would get an interest rate swap with a nil NPV at inception. 
The purpose of the valuations we have described so far is to calculate the value of the derivative 
assuming that neither side will default. Credit risk – CVA and DVA – is generally taken into account by 
a separate calculation. 
Taking both CVA and DVA into account, the value of the derivative (𝑓) to the bank is 
𝑓 = 𝑓𝑛𝑑 − 𝐶𝑉𝐴 + 𝐷𝑉𝐴 (10) 
defining 𝑓𝑛𝑑 as the no-default value of the derivatives portfolio to the bank, which is the equivalent to 
𝑉𝑠𝑤𝑎𝑝 as in equation (8). 
To calculate CVA and DVA, one divides the next T years into a number of intervals. Hence CVA is 
calculated as 
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𝐶𝑉𝐴 = ⁡∑𝑞𝑖𝑣𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
(11) 
when 𝑞𝑖 is the probability of an early termination during the interval arising from a counterparty 
default, 𝑣𝑖 is the present value of the expected loss of the derivatives portfolio if there is an early 
termination at the midpoint of the interval and 𝑁 is the number of intervals, whereas DVA is calculated 
as 
𝐷𝑉𝐴 =⁡∑𝑞𝑖
∗𝑣𝑖
∗
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
(12) 
where 𝑞𝑖
∗ is the probability of a default by the bank during the 𝑖th interval and 𝑣𝑖
∗ is the present value 
of the bank’s gain (and the counterparty’s loss) if the bank defaults at the midpoint of the interval. 
Letting 𝑉𝑠𝑤𝑎𝑝 = 𝑓𝑛𝑑, by combining (10), (11) and (12), one gets 
𝑓 = ⁡𝐵𝑓𝑖𝑥 − 𝐵𝑓𝑙 −∑𝑞𝑖𝑣𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
+∑𝑞𝑖
∗𝑣𝑖
∗
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
(13) 
As we’ll be seeing further on, such CVA/DVA adjustment as an implication on the IRS spreads. As the 
CVA/DVA tend to differ from each other, 𝑓 may turn not to be zero at incpetion. Therefore, a spread 
should be added either to 𝐵𝑓𝑖𝑥  or to 𝐵𝑓𝑙  in such way that 𝑓 = 0 at inception. This is called the credit 
spread. 
In order to get to that credit spread on has to go through each component of the CVA/DVA. Letting  
𝑞𝑖 = 𝐶𝑃𝐷𝑡;𝑦
𝐵  (14) 
𝑞𝑖
∗ = 𝐶𝑃𝐷𝑡;𝑦
𝐴  (15) 
𝑣𝑖 = 𝑣𝑖
∗ = 𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑡;𝑦 × 𝐿𝐺𝐷 (16) 
with 𝐶𝑃𝐷𝑡;𝑦
𝑋  (𝑋 = 𝐵𝑃𝐼, 𝐵𝐶𝑃) being the perceived probability at 𝑡 of counterparty 𝑋 defaulting during 
the 𝑦th year conditional to no prior default, 𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑡;𝑦 being the present value of the EAD at 𝑡 in case of 
default during the 𝑦th year and 𝐿𝐺𝐷 being the expected LGD, one has  
𝐶𝑉𝐴𝑡
𝐵𝑃𝐼 = ∑𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑡;𝑦 × 𝐶𝑃𝐷𝑡;𝑦
𝐵𝐶𝑃 × 𝐿𝐺𝐷
5−𝑡
𝑦=1
 (17) 
𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑡
𝐵𝑃𝐼 = ∑𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑡;𝑦 × 𝐶𝑃𝐷𝑡;𝑦
𝐵𝑃𝐼
5−𝑡
𝑦=1
× 𝐿𝐺𝐷 (18) 
Whereas 𝐸𝐴𝐷0;𝑦 is given by TABLE 3-1 - Expected Cash-Flows as of the begenning of 2010 and 𝐿𝐺𝐷 is 
to be assumed 25%. The 25% LGD is inferred from the 1983-2017 average recovery rate of 1st Lien 
Bank Loans as presented in the ‘Annual Default Study: Corporate Default and Recovery Rates, 1920 - 
2017’ report by Moody’s from 15 February 2018.  
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On estimating the 𝐶𝑃𝐷0;𝑦
𝑋 , as mentioned in MARKET-BASED ESTIMATION OF DEFAULT PROBABILITIES the 
probabilities of default7 are to be infered from the equity prices of these two companies. In order to 
do the so, the author has gathered both the year-end audited financial statements of each company 
as well as the their year-end closing stock prices from 2000 to 2015 (see TABLE 6-2 - Companies' 
Financials)8. The total FSLI amounts and the number of stocks at year-end for each company were 
extracted from the year-end audited financial statements of each company, the stock prices used were 
the ones provided by Euronext. 
Based on the information available for each company since 2010 up to PD estimation date, using Black 
& Scholes and Merton model, the each year’s 1-year PD have been estimated (see TABLE 3-2 - 
Companies' 1-year PDs). 
Table 3-2 - Companies' 1-year PDs 
Company 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
BPI 4% 3% 5% 9% 17% 29% 41% 42% 45% 49% 47% 45% 47% 48% 
BCP 9% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 6% 8% 20% 43% 41% 31% 21% 30% 
Source: author’s calculations 
Assuming the 1-year PDs old equal for the following periods, each year’s marginal conditional PDs 
(𝐶𝑃𝐷0;𝑦
𝑋 ) have been computed (see TABLE 3-3 - Marginal conditional PDs at inception (2010)). 
Table 3-3 - Marginal conditional PDs at inception (2010) 
Company 1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 5 years 
BPI 45% 25% 14% 7% 4% 
BCP 20% 16% 13% 10% 8% 
Source: author’s calculations 
Based on the above-mentioned information, by applying formulas (17) and (18) one gets: 
𝐶𝑉𝐴0
𝐵𝑃𝐼 = 1.4% 
𝐷𝑉𝐴0
𝐵𝑃𝐼 = 2.3% 
With 
𝐶𝑉𝐴0
𝐵𝑃𝐼 ≠ 𝐷𝑉𝐴0
𝐵𝑃𝐼 
and 
𝐵𝑓𝑖𝑥 = 𝐵𝑓𝑙  
                                                          
7 Another important assumption regarding the methodological approach of this thesis has to do with 
relationship between the probability of default and LGD. In this thesis it is assumed these are independent 
variables which isn’t always true (Altman, Brady, Resti, & Sironi, 2005). 
8 Financial restatements have been ignored as it is the author’s understanding that, not only the first 
version of the financial statements are the ones that the investor’s view on the performance of the company, 
because being such restatements pro forma (and therefore related with past information) its impact on the 
current stock price is neglectable. 
25 
 
The fair value of the derivative with no credit spread is therefore from the BPI’s point of view 0.9% of 
its notional value. Theoretically, at inception the value of an IRS is nil. In this case, it is not, which means 
that BCP would not be charging BPI for the fact that it has a greater credit risk.  
In order for the contract, not be beneficial to one of the counterparts BPI would have to pay a credit 
spread. In this case, only a credit spread of 0.11% would lead NPV of the swap to zero. It is assumed 
henceforward that such spread is going to be paid by BPI. 
Based on further changes in perceived counterparties’ credit risk the author is going to access in 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION whether or not PDs’ changes are going to impact the hedging relationship. 
Those results are going to be compared to the ones under the scenario of no credit risk. 
3.2. PREDICTING HEDGE ACCOUNTING EFFECTIVENESS 
In order to estimate the each of PDs presented in TABLE 3-2 - Companies' 1-year PDs three main types 
inputs have to be considered: 
 Debt per share (𝐷𝑡); 
 EV per share (𝐸𝑉𝑡); and 
 1-year interest rates (𝑟𝑡). 
 
The use of indicators such as Debt per share, and Enterprise Value per share, instead of Total Debt and 
Total Enterprise Value, is a way of overcoming the many increases of capital these companies have 
been subject to during the period in analysis. 
The Black and Scholes model premises that fair value of the Debt must be used, as mentioned in the 
EQUITY PRICES. In this thesis, the booking value of the sum of all liabilities is used as a proxy instead. 
This is mainly due to the lack of proper information available for the first years of time-period analyzed 
to make a good estimation of the fair value of the Debt for these companies. 
The first two of the previously mentioned inputs are derived from TABLE 6-2 - Companies' Financials 
as follows: 
𝐷𝑡
𝑋 =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙⁡𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡⁡𝑜𝑓⁡𝑋
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙⁡𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟⁡𝑜𝑓⁡𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠
 (18) 
𝐸𝑉𝑡
𝑋 =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙⁡𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡⁡𝑜𝑓⁡𝑋 +𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡⁡𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙⁡𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟⁡𝑜𝑓⁡𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠
 (19) 
Then, having computed 𝐸𝑉𝑋 volatility one applies the equation (7) in order to get the PDs. 
As explained in the INTRODUCTION the author assumes that the probability of hedge accounting 
effectiveness is function of both counterparties PDs volatility and their cross-correlation. 
In turn PDs, as shown in equation (7) are a function of a company’s total debt and enterprise value as 
wells as of the volatility of the EV itself. Therefore in order to compute the PDs in presented in TABLE 
3-2 - Companies' 1-year PDs, one has to make the transformations presented in TABLE 6-3 - PDs' 
estimation inputs by applying formulas (18) and (19). 
26 
 
Being the author’s goal to predict hedge accounting effectiveness, next a set of Monte Carlo 
simulations is run on the companies’ financials from the year 2010 onwards. In order to so, to author 
computed, 𝜀𝐷𝑡𝑋 and 𝜀𝐸𝑉𝑡𝑋, the differences between the actual debt/share (𝐷𝑡
𝑋) and EV/share (𝐸𝑉𝑡
𝑋) of 
companies at years 𝑡 and the expected total debt/share (𝐸[𝐷𝑡
𝑋]) and EV/share (𝐸[𝐸𝑉𝑡
𝑋]) of those 
companies’ based on previous-year financial information and interest rates, as follows: 
𝜀𝐷𝑡𝑋 = 𝐷𝑡
𝑋 − 𝐸[𝐷𝑡
𝑋] = 𝐷𝑡
𝑋 −𝐷𝑡−1
𝑋 × (1 + 𝑟𝑡−1) (20) 
𝜀𝐸𝑉𝑡𝑋 = 𝐸𝑉𝑡
𝑋 − 𝐸[𝐸𝑉𝑡
𝑋] = 𝐸𝑉𝑡
𝑋 − 𝐸𝑉𝑡−1
𝑋 × (1 + 𝑟𝑡−1) (21) 
By taking a look at output of the above mentioned equations in TABLE 6-4 - Using risk-free rate as 
predictor to comapnies financials' evolution one may see that the risk free rate is reasonable predictor 
to the evolution of companies’ financials. 
This being said, as mentioned in STOCHASTIC PROCESSES, a Weiner Processes is to be used in order to 
run the Monte Carlo simulations, being the increments randomly generated with mean being the 
increment that arises from the growth of the financial indicators at the risk free rate and standard 
deviation being 𝜀𝐷𝑡𝑋 and 𝜀𝐸𝑉𝑡𝑋  (normal distribution is assumed). 
Subsequently, 10,000 simulations are to be run using a routine specifically built on MS Excel9, with the 
evolution of the fluctuations on the derivative’s fair value to be monitored along side with the 
fluctuations of the fair value of the item to be hedged (fixed rate bond). The hedge effectiveness is 
assessed yearly and being it considered effective whenever evolution of the hedged and hedging item 
fall within the 80%-125% proposed by IAS 39. Although IFRS 9 does not specify any specific threshold 
for the hedge accounting effectiveness, it is the author’s view that market keeps on using such 
thresholds. 
By interpreting these simulations as Bernoulli Process, in ESTIMATING THE PROBABILITY OF 
INEFFECTIVENESS the author is going to come up with a probability of the hedge accounting to become 
ineffective. Both that probability and classification problem (based on the inputs of the simulations) 
are going to be compared with actual outcome of the hedging relationship. 
3.3. THE IMPACT OF PDS VOLATILITIES AND CROSS-CORRELATION ON HEDGE EFFECTIVENESS 
Then, based on the random walks taken by the Debt per share and Enterprise Value  per share of each 
company (simulated based on the Wiener Process), the hedging accounting ineffectiveness is to be 
modelled based as polynomial function of each counterparty PD as well as their cross correlation. 
In section IN THE next section the author illustrates how variables such as volatilities of the PDs and 
their cross correlation affect hedge ineffectiveness. 
Ineffectiveness drivers the author will be stepping in the components of the polynomial regression 
(counterparties’ PD volatilities and cross-correlation) in order to corroborate its hypotheses (ii) and 
(iii). The orders of the regressions are be chosen. The regressions that arise from those chosen orders 
                                                          
9 The author performs 100 simulations on the financials of both companies separately. By making all the 
possible combinations of those 100 simulations from both, one gets in total 10,000 simulations. 
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will later be of major importance, as it is going to be seen how other factor (covered by the generic 
approach) are affecting the results of the BPI-BCP hypothetical interest rate swap. 
3.4. GENERIC APPROACH 
In order to assess in what extent the work done on the BPI and BCP hypothetical IRS is affected by 
other factors, a parallel approach is going to be considered in GENERIC APPROACH. This approach allowes 
on to see the response of the hedge efectiveness for a similar contract but with different PDs, LGDs 
and interest rates. 
Another 10,00 simulations are to be run on the changes of the value of the IRS troughout time. The 
goal is to see how in general other factors such as the PDs at incepction, the interest rates and the 
LGDs contribute to hedge efectivenes as well. 
A 5-year IRS is to be considered as well but this time an interest rate with flat term structure is to 
considered. It is to be assumed that such interets rate will not change trough time and, therefore, nor 
the NPV of the bond to hedged, in order to access the impact of EAD (driven by the interest rate of the 
swaps) on the hedging efectiveness. For a matter of simplicity, the PDs of both counterparties are 
always going to be equal at inception. This way no computation of credit psread is going to be needed. 
With the 𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑡;𝑦 being dependent solely on the flat interest rate curve (𝑟), 𝐶𝑃𝐷𝑡;𝑦
𝑋  is set be dependent 
on variables such as 𝑃𝐷0 (perceived marginal probability of default at inception which takes a flat term 
structure as well), 𝜎𝑋 (standard deviation of the one-year changes of the PDs of counterparty 𝑋) and 
𝜌𝐴,𝐵 (correlation between the annual PD changes of counterparties A and B). 
As 𝑟 may take negative values, the EAD is to be computed as follows 
𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑡;𝑦 = ∑
|𝑟|
(1 + 𝑟)𝑦−𝑡−0.5
𝑦−𝑡
5−𝑦=0
 
(22) 
For the CPD, the computation is to be made as follows 
𝐶𝑃𝐷𝑡;𝑦
𝑋 = (1 − 𝑃𝐷𝑡
𝑋)𝑦−𝑡−1 × 𝑃𝐷𝑡
𝑋 (23) 
having 𝑃𝐷𝑡
𝑋s following a stochastic process such a way that  
𝑚𝑖𝑛 [𝑚𝑎𝑥 [
𝑃𝐷𝑡
𝑋
𝑃𝐷𝑡−1
𝑋 − 1~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝐴); 0.01] , 0.99] 
(24) 
and that the expected unconstrained correlation between the 𝑃𝐷𝑡
𝑋s being  𝜌𝐴,𝐵. 
Under this more generic approach, the value of Swap, 𝑓𝑡 , is to be regard as being function of 𝑃𝐷0, 𝐿𝐺𝐷, 
𝜎𝐴, 𝜎𝐵, 𝜌𝐴,𝐵 and 𝑟. To assess the sensitivity of the derivative to these values, 10,000 scenarios are to 
be randomly generated in such a way that 
𝑃𝐷0, 𝜎𝐴, 𝜎𝐵, 𝐿𝐺𝐷~𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑁𝐷(𝑈[0; 1] × 0.99 + 0.005; 2) (25) 
𝜌𝐴,𝐵~𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑁𝐷(𝑈[0; 1] × 2.01 − 1.005; 2) (26) 
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𝑟~𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑁𝐷(𝑈[0; 1] × 0.21 − 0.105; 2) (27) 
For each scenario (𝑠) one simulation is to be made, based on which the hedging relationship is to be 
classified as ineffective (𝐼 = 1) or not (𝐼 = 0):  
I(F = max
𝑡=1,2,3,4
𝑓𝑡) = {
1, 𝐹 > 0.05
0, 𝐹 ≤ 0.05
 (28) 
A multivariate polynomial regression model is then to be used in order measure the relationship 
between 𝐼 and the independent variables (See INTERPRETING THE RESULTS OF THE MULTIVARIATE 
POLYNOMIAL REGRESSION). 
Having estimated 𝐼, the optimal cut-off is to be selected based (as form of statistical classification) on 
its accuracy rate. Then the author is going to check if the this generic approach does a got job in 
predicting hedge accounting ineffectiveness when applied to hypothetical IRS set between BCP and 
BPI in the previous sections.  
 
In the next section, author evaluates the results that ariseses from employing the methods of each of 
the three subsections. The results the methodological approaches define in each subsection of the 
section are presented, in  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION, in the same order. 
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4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
In the following three subsections, the author evaluates the results that arises from employing the 
methods of each of the four subsections described above. Further on in IN the next section, the author 
oversees the thesis as all. Having gone through the results of current chapter, it is reflected in what 
these results are consistent with the literature and the current regulatory environment. 
Conclusions the author draws the main conclusions and goes through the key takeways. 
4.1. IRS HEDGING EFFECTIVENESS 
As mentioned in the section SETTING UP AN IRS a hypothetical 5-years uncollateralized IRS is to be set 
up between BPI and BCP as of the 31 of December 2010. With such contract BPI aims to hedge against 
the interest rate risk of 5-years fixed-rate triple AAA bond issued at same date denominated in euros, 
being that both instruments (the bond and the IRS) have same notional values (100%). Being the bond 
issued at the end 2010, its interest rate paid annually is to be 2,1% (see TABLE 6-1 - Year-end AAA rated 
bonds interest rates according to ECB). As this bond is issued at pair, the amount to be lend as well as 
the NPV of the bond is equal to its face value. However, as cash-flows are paid and due to changes in 
the interest rate curve, the NPV flutcuates until its maturity as follows: 
 
Illustrations 1 - Fluctuations of the NPV of the bond 
The graph above is a good illustration of how sensitive the price of the bond is to changes in the interest 
rates trough time. In general, the larger the duration of the bond the higher it’s sensitivity to interest 
rate changes (Merton, 1974). If one looks at the interest rate changes that occued in 2011 and 2013, 
one may see how similar decreases interest rates had different impacts on the price of the bond. In 
2013, notoriously the duration effect offset the interest rate risk effect, as the bond reached maturity. 
As the duration of the bond differs from the duration of the IRS, because there is no exchange of 
notional at maturity, this may impact the hedge accounting effectiveness. In order to get further 
insights on this, we assess, in the next section, at what time the hedging accounting relationship it is 
more probable the hedge to turn innefective. 
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When plotting the value of the bond alongside with value of the collateralized and uncollateralized 
derivative, one has: 
 
Illustrations 2 - Flutations of bond’s prices and of both the collateralized and uncolleteralized IRS 
The graph, as expected, illustrates that the NPV of the IRS tends to move in the opposite direction of 
the NPV of bond. However the changes in the NPV of the IRSs differ from each other depending on 
whether the instruments is collateralized. In these case, as illustrated in the graph below, while the 
collateralized IRS would hedge perfectly against the interest rate risk of the bond (changes in the NPV 
of the bond due to changes in the interest rates, see Illustration 1), the uncollateralized IRS would lead 
hedge accounting to become ineffective in 2012: 
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Illustrations 3 - Hedge Accounting Innefectiveness 
 
This demonstrates how the counterparty credit risk in the hedging instrument affects the hedging 
effectiveness. In such scenario, BPI could no longer designate in its financial statements the IRS as 
hedge derivative. On the balance sheet the IRS would have to be reclassified from the hedging 
derivatives FSLI, to Derivatives Held for Trading. In other hand, on the Profit and Loss statement, 
fluctuations of the NPV of the derivative could no longer be used to offset in changes of the price of 
the Bond within its FSLI. Instead the fluctuations of both instruments would have to be accounted 
separately. This would lead to higher volatility within Profit and Loss statements, which could impact 
on the investors perception of the company's risk and profitability. 
Next section analysis in what extent the (in)effectiveness of this hedge relationship could have been 
predicted. 
4.2. ESTIMATING THE PROBABILITY OF INEFFECTIVENESS 
As mentioned before, in order to predict if the hedge relationship detailed in the previous was going 
to be effective the author as run a set simulations on the stochastic processes on the companies’ 
financials in order access how its impact on the implied changes of their credit risk. The illustration 
below demonstrates the outcome of two randomly generated Wiener Process on the financials of BPI 
from 2010 onwards as well as its impacts on the implied PDs.10 
                                                          
10 The figure illustrates one more limitation on of the limitations to the PD estimation approach of this 
thesis, as it does not take into account how regulators react to banks to the possibility of imminent default. In 
many of the scenarios generated randomly, one of the companies default leading the hedge to become 
ineffective. In reality, when the banks face financial distress central banks require the entities to raise more 
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Illustrations 4 - Simultations on the BPI's financials and their impact on the PD 
Having been run 100 simulations of these for each company and having then taken into consideration 
all the possible combinations of the simulations of both companies, 10,000 scenarios ended up being 
generated. For each of those scenarios, it was assessed whether or not the eventual hedging 
relationship would have been effective or not. In 84,75% of the cases they weren’t, which is normal 
given the fact the PDs at 2010 were very high due to the 2008 financial crises. Each change on PDs 
could then be so significant that could lead the uncollateralized IRS to be extremely volatile. This result 
is consistent with fact that, as shown in section IRS HEDGING EFFECTIVENESS, the IRS would actually turn 
out to be ineffective. 
Most hedging relationships would turn out to be ineffective either at the 1st or 2nd year, with the not 
significant incremental hedge ineffective rates in the following years. 
Table 4-1 - Evolution of the hedge innefectiveness rates troughout the years 
2011 2012 2013 2014 Total 
43,85% 34,87% 3,50% 2,53% 84,75% 
Source: author’s calculations 
This has to do with two reasons: (i) as mentioned before the PDs of the two entities were significantly 
high at 2010 in 2011 (Portugal was in the process of being rescued by Troika11); (ii) during the 
subsequent years the Portuguese banks were forced to raise capital (see Table 3) which lead to a 
significant decreased in their perceived credit risk (see graph below), under the PD estimation model 
used by the author. 
                                                          
capital, therefore avoiding default. Table 3 demonstrates that in the 2000-2015, BPI and BCP have raised capital 
at least 4 and 10 times, respectively. Moreover, against the odds (being that the estimated PD of BPI remained 
above 30% since 2008) in fact none of the counterparties actually defaulted during the time-period in analysis. 
11 Decision group formed by the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund in order to rescue European governments from financial distress in the years following the 2008 
crisis. 
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Illustrations 5 - Distribution of that PDs that arise from the Wiener Process 
This can further be illustrated by the Markov transition matrices of the PDs of these entities under the 
PD estimation model used by the author (see TABLE 6-5 - MARKOV TRANSICTION MATRIXES OF THE PDS UNDER 
WIENER PROCESS). 
In the next section the author illustrates how variables such as volatilities of the PDs and their cross 
correlation affect hedge ineffectiveness. 
4.3. INEFFECTIVENESS DRIVERS 
As mentioned in the METHODOLOGY section the author’s goal is assess how the hedge effectiveness 
responds to the three following variables: 
 One’s own PD volatility; 
 The volatility of the PD of the counterparty; and 
 The correlation between these two PDs. 
 
Although one can estimate the probability of hedge ineffectiveness as shown before, in the decision 
making process on whether engage or not on the hedge a quantitative threshold may defined in order 
to make that decision. 
Therefore, for each of the 3 independent variables, polynomial regressions of order from 1 to 3 have 
been made in order to assess the order of the regression to be used: 
Table 4-2 - Polynomial Regressions R Squared 
Regression 
Order 
R Squared 
BPI PD Volatility BCP PD Volatility Cross-correlation 
1 0.0618 0.4770 0.5254 
2 0.3312 0.4945 0.5037 
3 0.3312 0.5149 0.6072 
    
Chosen order 2 1 1 
Source: author’s calculations 
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Below one may see how the hedge ineffectiveness varies with the volatilities of the PDs: 
 
Illustrations 6 - The impact of the volatalities of the PDs on innefectiveness rate 
 
Whereas the volatility of the PD of BPI doesn’t seem to have much influence the hedge accounting 
ineffectiveness, with ineffectiveness rates in the 80-85% range, the higher the volatility in the case of 
BCP the greater the chance of ineffectiveness12. Intuitively, BCP corroborates the authors' hypothesis. 
BPI, in other hand, shows that author’s theory cannot be confirmed in all cases. Apparently, the fact 
the PD of BPI at inception is very high leads to higher ineffectiveness rates, as the volatility of the PD 
                                                          
12 In both Illustrations 6 and 7 some columns appear in grey. That is so because the Wiener Process did 
not generate any data for those buckets. The author has therefore made use of linear interpolations to estimate 
the correspondent ineffectiveness rates. 
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itself doesn’t appear to be significant. The results presented further explored in PROBABILITIES OF 
DEFAULT (see ILLUSTRATIONS 8 - 3rd order polynomial regression for the PD0) corroborate this view. 
The next illustration corroborates the second hypothesis. The higher the correlation of the PDs the 
lower the ineffectiveness rate, as the CVA/DVA move in the same direction and, therefore, tend to 
offset each other. 
 
Illustrations 7 - The impact of correlation of the PDs on ineffectiveness rate 
This suggests that, whereas banks may feel comfortable in engaging in uncollateralized derivative to 
hedge against a certain risk with peers within their country (for instance), difference country risks 
within an IRS transaction is more likely to lead to hedge ineffectiveness. For example, Portuguese 
banks after the financial crises doing hedge accounting with an IRS with Spanish bank, in the hedge 
accounting point of view, would have been a better choice than doing so with a bank from any other 
unrelated economy. These results will further be reinforced by ILLUSTRATIONS 13 - 2nd order regression 
of the PDs cross-correlations in VOLATILITY OF PERCEIVED CREDIT RISK. The questions that now arise are: 
 To what extent the results in section can be extrapolated. 
 How do factors, such as interest rates, initial PDs and the assumed LGD, are affecting the 
results? 
 
Next section answers those questions. 
4.4. GENERIC APPROACH 
Recalling the methodology approach proposed in GENERIC APPROACH this subsection illustrates how 
hedge ineffectiveness responds to factors such as interest rates, initial PDs and the assumed LGD. 
Some simplifications have been made (flat interest rate curves), being that, instead of having the BCP-
BPI scenario of 2010, random scenarios of been randomly generated. For each scenario, a wiener 
process on the PDs have been generated as well, modeled as explained in GENERIC APPROACH. 
As in the previous section, polynomial regressions on each independent variable were run in order to 
access how they influence the hedge ineffectiveness rates. In the tables below, the author chooses the 
order the regressions based on the impact of each order increase on the R-Square. 
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Tabla 4-3 - Univariate polynamial regressions 
Regression 
Order 
R Square 
PD LGD σ_a σ_a ρ_a,b r 
1 0.49 0.91 0.65 0.66 0.39 0.04 
2 0.75 0.91 0.66 0.67 0.44 0.95 
3 0.79 0.92 0.66 0.67 0.44 0.95 
4 0.79 0.92 0.67 0.69 0.44 0.99 
       
Chosen order 3 1 1 1 2 2 
Source: author’s calculations 
In the following subsections, from PROBABILITIES OF DEFAULT to INTEREST RATES, each independent 
variable are going to be plotted against its correspondent hedge ineffectiveness rate. The results of 
the multivariate polynomial regressions, with the above chosen orders, are going analyzed in 
INTERPRETING THE RESULTS OF THE MULTIVARIATE POLYNOMIAL REGRESSION. Finally the a statistical 
classification is going to be conducted in STATISTICAL CLASSIFICATION. 
4.4.1. Probabilities of default 
While for lower level PDs the higher the 𝑃𝐷0 the higher the probability of ineffectiveness, for high 
level PDs its marginal affect on ineffectiveness is null.  
 
Illustrations 8 - 3rd order polynomial regression for the PD0 
The marginal impact of lower level PDs in hedging ineffectiveness may be explained by the fact that 
has PDs increase the fluctuation range of the CVA/DVA increases as well (see ILLUSTRATIONS 9 - Standard 
fluctuation range for the DVA at the 2nd year per PD0). However, once PDs get to a certain point, the 
effect of the LGDs in hedge ineffectiveness starts to dominate. These results are consistent with results 
shown in ILLUSTRATIONS 6 - The impact of the volatalities of the PDs on innefectiveness rate in IN THE 
next section the author illustrates how variables such as volatilities of the PDs and their cross 
correlation affect hedge ineffectiveness. 
Ineffectiveness drivers. 
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Illustrations 9 - Standard fluctuation range for the DVA at the 2nd year per PD0  
4.4.2. Loss given default 
The higher the expected LGD the higher the probability of a hedging relationship to turn out ineffective 
(see ILLUSTRATIONS 10 - 1st order regression of the LGD). 
 
Illustrations 10 - 1st order regression of the LGD 
Unlike the PD, the impact of the LGD in the probability of ineffectiveness is linear. The higher the LGD 
the greater the impact of PDs on CVA/DVA and therefore on hedge accounting effectiveness. 
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Illustrations 11 - Standard fluctuation range for the DVA at the 2nd year per LGD 
4.4.3. Volatility of perceived credit risk and cross-correlation 
The volatility of perceived credit (𝜎𝐴 and 𝜎𝐵) risk is linearly related with hedging ineffectiveness as well 
(see ILLUSTRATIONS 12 - 1st order regression of the volalities of perceived counterparties credit risk). 
 
Illustrations 12 - 1st order regression of the volalities of perceived counterparties credit risk 
In most real cases, there is correlation between the perceived counterparty credit risk as most 
derivatives undertaken in the OTC market are done between banks and other financial institutions, as 
mentioned in THE USE OF DERIVATIVES. Data confirms that the author’s suggestion that the higher the 
correlation the lower the probability of a hedging relation to turn out to be ineffective holds (see 
ILLUSTRATIONS 13 - 2nd order regression of the PDs cross-correlations). 
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Illustrations 13 - 2nd order regression of the PDs cross-correlations 
These results are consistent with the ones plotted in ILLUSTRATIONS 7 - The impact of correlation of the 
PDs on ineffectiveness rate in THE IMPACT OF PDS VOLATILITIES AND CROSS-CORRELATION ON HEDGE 
EFFECTIVENESS. 
4.4.4. Interest rates 
Regarding the relationship between interest rates and hedging ineffectiveness, two effects are taking 
place (see ILLUSTRATIONS 14 - 2nd order polynomial regression the interest rates In one hand, the higher 
the absolute value of the interest rates the higher the probability of ineffectiveness. That is because 
higher 𝑟 means higher EAD what leads the CVA/DVA to be higher. In other and, one may see as well 
that the impact of negative interest rates on hedging ineffectiveness is higher when compared to 
positive ones. 
This is explained by the fact that when discounting future interest payments, positive 𝑟 diminishes the 
present value of the EAD whereas negative 𝑟 increases it. These results are particularly important in 
current context of low interest rates. 
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Illustrations 14 - 2nd order polynomial regression the interest rates 
4.4.5. Interpreting the results of the multivariate polynomial regression 
The output of the multivariate polynomial regression is consistent with chapter AS IN the previous 
section, polynomial regressions on each independent variable were run in order to access how they 
influence the hedge ineffectiveness rates. In the tables below, the author chooses the order the 
regressions based on the impact of each order increase on the R-Square. 
Tabla 4-3 - Univariate polynamial regressions, having no parameter a p-value greater than 5% (see 
TABLA 4-4 - Multivariate polynomial regressions) and adjusted R squared of 32%. 
Tabla 4-4 - Multivariate polynomial regressions 
Parameters Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Intercept -0.60 0.02 -34.95 0.00 -0.64 -0.57 
PD 1.22 0.11 10.62 0.00 0.99 1.45 
PD^2 -1.75 0.27 -6.54 0.00 -2.27 -1.22 
PD^3 0.81 0.18 4.61 0.00 0.47 1.16 
LGD 0.47 0.01 41.98 0.00 0.45 0.50 
σ_a 0.19 0.01 16.93 0.00 0.17 0.21 
σ_b 0.18 0.01 16.39 0.00 0.16 0.20 
ρ_a,b -0.08 0.01 -15.12 0.00 -0.09 -0.07 
ρ_a,b^2 -0.02 0.01 -2.02 0.04 -0.04 0.00 
r -0.36 0.05 -6.82 0.00 -0.47 -0.26 
r^2 39.45 0.98 40.18 0.00 37.53 41.38 
Source: author’s calculations 
4.4.6. Statistical classification 
Based on the above computed coefficients, 𝐼 has been computed and the accuracy of the classification 
of each simulation as ineffective or not as been computed for several cut-off points (see Table 3). 
Tabla 4-5 - Statistical classification 
Cut-off -0.50 -0.40 -0.30 -0.20 -0.10 0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 
                                
TP 1865 1865 1865 1865 1865 1864 1859 1786 1544 1128 642 321 102 26 0 
FP 8135 8120 8047 7800 7153 6028 4542 2909 1531 561 169 37 6 0 0 
FN 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 79 321 737 1223 1544 1763 1839 1865 
TN 0 15 88 335 982 2107 3593 5226 6604 7574 7966 8098 8129 8135 8135 
                                
PPV 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.21 0.24 0.29 0.38 0.50 0.67 0.79 0.90 0.94 1.00 1.00 
NPV 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.95 0.91 0.87 0.84 0.82 0.82 0.81 
Specificity 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.12 0.26 0.44 0.64 0.81 0.93 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
1- Specificity 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.96 0.88 0.74 0.56 0.36 0.19 0.07 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Sensitivity 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.96 0.83 0.60 0.34 0.17 0.05 0.01 0.00 
                                
Accuracy 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.22 0.28 0.40 0.55 0.70 0.81 0.87 0.86 0.84 0.82 0.82 0.81 
Source: author’s calculations 
This being so, this model allows us to predict if a given hedging relationship is going to turn out to be 
ineffective or not with a 87% accuracy rate. See ILLUSTRATIONS 15 - ROC curve in APPENDIX. 
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In the next section, the author oversees the thesis as all. Having gone through the results of current 
chapter, it is reflected in what these results are consistent with the literature and the current 
regulatory environment. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
The use of derivatives has increased significantly during the last two decades, being one of its major 
uses the hedge against a certain risk. Among the financial institutions, the main users of derivatives, 
the main risk they want hedge is interest rate risk. When doing so, for risk managers, the impact of risk 
management activities on the financials is crucial in the decision-making process. A new accounting 
standard (IFRS 9) has recently been enforced. Under this standard, there are fewer restrictions on 
hedge accounting documentation. However, the standard raises a concern: when using 
uncollateralized derivatives the hedge may turn out to become ineffective in case CVA/DVA 
overweight the changes of the price of the derivative itself in respect to its underlying. 
Literature shows that the manager’s concern with hedge accounting may be positively correlated with 
companies’ performance. However, in the last few years regulators focus on governance issues have 
been shifting to more technical issues, such as how counterparty credit risk may affect hedge 
ineffectiveness. Extensive use of market-based estimations of credit risk is now being made. 
In his thesis we show how credit risk does affect hedge accounting effectiveness, when using 
uncollateralized derivatives, by looking at the case of a hypothetical IRS set up between BCP and BPI 
during the European sovereign debt crises. The thesis further suggests that Monte Carlo simulations 
may be run in other to estimate the probability of hedge accounting ineffectiveness. By conducting 
these for BCP and BPI, the author corroborates the main hypothesis. In one hand, the higher the 
volatilities of the PDs the higher the hedge ineffectiveness, being that, in other hand, this effect may 
be offset in case the PDs are highly correlated. 
Having let the BCP-BPI case aside, the more generic approach unveiled further interesting results. In 
fact, the higher the PDs and their volatility, the higher hedge ineffectiveness. But just up to certain 
level, after which other significant aspects, such as LGD, start to kick in. The higher the LGD the more 
probable it is for a hedge to become infective, has the sensitivity of CVA/DVA to other variables 
increases. On interest rates, the current environment of low interest rates is beneficial for hedge 
accounting. As the ratio between IRSs market value and their notional is now low, the EAD of IRSs are 
low as well. These results hold for the OTC derivatives market, the main reason why there is credit risk.  
The shift to central clearing is a key element of financial system reforms in the aftermath of the Great 
Financial Crisis. To reduce the systemic risks resulting from bilateral trading, the G20 Leaders agreed 
at the 2009 Pittsburgh Summit that all standardised derivatives contracts should be traded on 
exchanges or electronic trading platforms, where appropriate, and cleared through central 
counterparties. In contrast to the OTC Market, CCPs interpose themselves between two counterparties 
in a financial transaction. After the parties have agreed to a trade, CCPs become the buyers to every 
sellers and the sellers to every buyers. In doing so, the CCP reduces counterparty credit and liquidity 
risk exposures through netting (Domanski, Gambacorta, & Picillo, 2015). CCPs had, indeed, proved 
resilient during the crisis, continuing to clear contracts even when bilateral markets had dried up. 
As appealing as this approach may sound, the shift to CPP doesn’t eliminate risk. In particular, the 
concentration of the risks in the CCP may affect market price and liquidity dynamics in ways that are 
not yet understood. Recent research has analysed the structure and behaviour of financial networks, 
but lack of data and, much more fundamentally, our incomplete understanding of the post-crisis 
financial system prevent us from assessing how exactly central clearing might affect systemic risks. 
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Notwithstanding, it is recognized by regulators how CPPs do reduce credit risk. Basel III adequacy ratios 
calculation methodology does incintive banks to use CPP rather than OTC market. Minimal capital 
requirements for credit risk states that “the capital requirement for CVA risk must be calculated by all 
banks involved in covered transactions”. But it adds, “covered transactions include all derivatives 
except those transacted directly with a qualified central counterparty”.  
The literature on the impacts of new the hedge accounting guidance of IFRS 9 is still immature. 
However, an systematic assessment has been made on whether the hedging behaviour of corporate 
treasurers in France has been affected by the issuance of IFRS 9 dealing with financial instruments and 
hedging. 48 semi-structured interviews were conducted with French corporate treasurers and 
representatives of Big 4 audit firms.  
It has been found that corporate treasurers often make decisions based on earnings impact. This 
finding is similar to findings in prior literature regarding the effects of accounting standards on 
economic decisions taken by managers. A fear of increased earnings volatility is central to the 
treasurers’ concerns. Also key is the complexity of the process for qualifying financial instruments for 
hedge accounting treatment. The authors also find that the behavior of corporate treasurers is neither 
stable nor homogeneous. The behavior appears to be the outcome of a collective learning process in 
which the corporate treasurer is only one actor (Gumb, Dupuy, Baker, & Blum, 2018). 
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6. APPENDIX 
Table 6-1 - Year-end AAA rated bonds interest rates according to ECB 
Maturity 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
3 months 2,3% 3,4% 3,9% 1,8% 0,4% 0,5% 0,0% 0,1% 0,1% 0,0% -0,5% 
6 months 2,5% 3,6% 3,9% 1,8% 0,5% 0,5% 0,0% 0,0% 0,1% -0,1% -0,4% 
9 months 2,6% 3,7% 4,0% 1,8% 0,7% 0,5% 0,0% 0,0% 0,1% -0,1% -0,4% 
1 year 2,6% 3,8% 4,0% 1,8% 0,8% 0,6% 0,1% 0,0% 0,1% -0,1% -0,4% 
2 years 2,8% 3,8% 4,0% 2,1% 1,4% 0,9% 0,4% 0,0% 0,2% -0,1% -0,3% 
3 years 2,9% 3,8% 4,0% 2,4% 1,9% 1,3% 0,8% 0,1% 0,5% -0,1% -0,3% 
4 years 2,9% 3,8% 4,1% 2,7% 2,3% 1,8% 1,2% 0,3% 0,8% 0,0% -0,1% 
5 years 2,9% 3,8% 4,1% 3,0% 2,6% 2,1% 1,6% 0,6% 1,1% 0,1% 0,0% 
6 years 3,0% 3,8% 4,2% 3,2% 2,9% 2,5% 1,9% 0,8% 1,4% 0,2% 0,2% 
7 years 3,0% 3,9% 4,2% 3,3% 3,2% 2,8% 2,1% 1,1% 1,6% 0,3% 0,3% 
8 years 3,1% 3,9% 4,3% 3,5% 3,4% 3,0% 2,3% 1,3% 1,9% 0,4% 0,5% 
9 years 3,1% 3,9% 4,3% 3,6% 3,6% 3,2% 2,5% 1,5% 2,1% 0,5% 0,6% 
10 years 3,2% 3,9% 4,4% 3,7% 3,8% 3,4% 2,6% 1,7% 2,2% 0,6% 0,8% 
11 years 3,3% 3,9% 4,4% 3,8% 3,9% 3,5% 2,8% 1,9% 2,4% 0,8% 0,9% 
12 years 3,3% 3,9% 4,4% 3,8% 4,0% 3,6% 2,8% 2,0% 2,5% 0,9% 1,0% 
13 years 3,4% 4,0% 4,5% 3,9% 4,1% 3,6% 2,9% 2,1% 2,6% 1,0% 1,1% 
14 years 3,4% 4,0% 4,5% 3,9% 4,2% 3,7% 2,9% 2,2% 2,7% 1,0% 1,2% 
15 years 3,4% 4,0% 4,5% 4,0% 4,2% 3,7% 3,0% 2,3% 2,8% 1,1% 1,2% 
16 years 3,5% 4,0% 4,5% 4,0% 4,3% 3,7% 3,0% 2,4% 2,8% 1,2% 1,3% 
17 years 3,5% 4,0% 4,6% 4,0% 4,3% 3,7% 3,0% 2,4% 2,9% 1,2% 1,3% 
18 years 3,5% 4,0% 4,6% 4,0% 4,4% 3,8% 3,0% 2,5% 2,9% 1,3% 1,4% 
19 years 3,6% 4,0% 4,6% 4,0% 4,4% 3,8% 3,1% 2,5% 2,9% 1,3% 1,4% 
20 years 3,6% 4,0% 4,6% 4,0% 4,4% 3,8% 3,1% 2,5% 2,9% 1,4% 1,5% 
21 years 3,6% 4,0% 4,6% 4,0% 4,4% 3,7% 3,1% 2,5% 2,9% 1,4% 1,5% 
22 years 3,6% 4,0% 4,6% 3,9% 4,4% 3,7% 3,1% 2,5% 2,9% 1,4% 1,5% 
23 years 3,6% 4,1% 4,6% 3,9% 4,4% 3,7% 3,1% 2,5% 2,9% 1,4% 1,6% 
24 years 3,7% 4,1% 4,7% 3,9% 4,4% 3,7% 3,1% 2,5% 2,9% 1,5% 1,6% 
25 years 3,7% 4,1% 4,7% 3,9% 4,4% 3,7% 3,1% 2,5% 2,9% 1,5% 1,6% 
26 years 3,7% 4,1% 4,7% 3,8% 4,4% 3,7% 3,1% 2,5% 2,9% 1,5% 1,6% 
27 years 3,7% 4,1% 4,7% 3,8% 4,4% 3,7% 3,1% 2,4% 2,9% 1,5% 1,7% 
28 years 3,7% 4,1% 4,7% 3,8% 4,4% 3,7% 3,1% 2,4% 2,9% 1,5% 1,7% 
29 years 3,7% 4,1% 4,7% 3,7% 4,4% 3,7% 3,1% 2,4% 2,9% 1,5% 1,7% 
30 years 3,7% 4,1% 4,7% 3,7% 4,4% 3,7% 3,1% 2,4% 2,9% 1,5% 1,7% 
Source: BCE (www.ecb.europa.eu, visted las time on the 30th of november) 
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Table 6-2 - Companies' Financials 
Year 
BPI's Total 
Liabilities 
(thousands 
of euros) 
BPI's Total 
number of 
shares 
BPI's 
shares 
closing 
price 
BCP's Total 
Liabilities 
(thousands of 
euros) 
BCP's Total 
number of 
shares 
BCP's 
Shares 
closing 
price 
2000 20.681.562 645.625.000 3,34 58.877.549 2.101.562.549 5,65 
2001 23.579.343 645.625.000 2,26 59.426.316 2.326.714.877 4,55 
2002 24.247.093 760.000.000 2,18 58.307.882 2.326.714.877 2,28 
2003 24.705.024 760.000.000 2,50 63.343.313 3.257.400.827 7,14 
2004 22.483.162 760.000.000 2,55 66.487.954 3.257.400.827 7,63 
2005 28.671.042 760.000.000 3,30 72.247.582 3.588.331.338 9,40 
2006 33.838.180 760.000.000 5,05 74.190.806 3.611.329.567 11,30 
2007 38.640.490 760.000.000 4,58 83.266.906 3.611.329.567 11,78 
2008 41.041.869 900.000.000 1,56 88.175.490 4.694.600.000 3,65 
2009 45.146.489 900.000.000 1,89 88.329.609 4.694.600.000 3,79 
2010 43.695.865 900.000.000 1,23 92.762.263 4.694.600.000 2,61 
2011 42.133.529 990.000.000 0,47 89.107.706 7.207.167.060 0,66 
2012 42.503.937 1.390.000.000 0,94 85.743.851 19.707.167.060 0,56 
2013 40.393.420 1.390.000.000 1,22 78.731.225 19.707.167.060 1,25 
2014 40.083.202 1.456.924.237 1,03 71.374.009 54.194.709.415 0,85 
2015 37.837.793 1.456.924.237 1,09 69.204.308 59.039.023.275 0,63 
Source: companies’ websites (visited last time on th 17th of october) 
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Table 6-3 - PDs' estimation inputs 
Year BPI's 
Debt/share 
BCP's 
Debt/share 
BPI's 
EV/share 
BCP's 
EV/share 
BPI's EV/share 
volatility 
BCP's EV/share 
volatility 
2000 32,03 28,02 35,37 33,67 - - 
2001 36,52 25,54 38,78 30,09 7% 8% 
2002 31,90 25,06 34,08 27,34 7% 10% 
2003 32,51 19,45 35,00 26,59 6% 11% 
2004 29,58 20,41 32,13 28,04 7% 10% 
2005 37,73 20,13 41,02 29,54 9% 9% 
2006 44,52 20,54 49,57 31,84 16% 9% 
2007 50,84 23,06 55,42 34,84 21% 10% 
2008 45,60 18,78 47,16 22,44 20% 13% 
2009 50,16 18,82 52,05 22,60 20% 15% 
2010 48,55 19,76 49,78 22,37 19% 16% 
2011 42,56 12,36 43,03 13,02 18% 23% 
2012 30,58 4,35 31,52 4,91 19% 33% 
2013 29,06 4,00 30,28 5,24 21% 41% 
2014 27,51 1,32 28,54 2,17 22% 49% 
2015 25,97 1,17 27,06 1,80 23% 56% 
Source: author’s calculations 
Table 6-4 - Using risk-free rate as predictor to comapnies financials' evolution 
Year 
BPI E[D/ 
Share] 
BPI E[EV/ 
Share] 
BPI D/ 
Share Dif 
BPI EV/ 
Share Dif 
BCP E[D/ 
Share] 
BCP E[EV/ 
Share] 
BCP D/ 
Share Dif 
BCP EV/ 
Share Dif 
2001 33,60 37,10 -0,08 -0,04 29,38 35,31 0,15 0,17 
2002 37,73 40,06 0,18 0,18 26,38 31,08 0,05 0,14 
2003 32,82 35,06 0,01 0,00 25,78 28,12 0,33 0,06 
2004 33,28 35,84 0,12 0,12 19,91 27,22 -0,02 -0,03 
2005 30,26 32,87 -0,20 -0,20 20,88 28,68 0,04 -0,03 
2006 38,80 42,20 -0,13 -0,15 20,71 30,38 0,01 -0,05 
2007 46,23 51,47 -0,09 -0,07 21,33 33,06 -0,07 -0,05 
2008 52,89 57,65 0,16 0,22 23,99 36,24 0,28 0,62 
2009 46,72 48,31 -0,07 -0,07 19,24 22,98 0,02 0,02 
2010 51,10 53,02 0,05 0,07 19,17 23,03 -0,03 0,03 
 
Avrg. 40,34 43,36 0,00 0,00 22,68 29,61 0,07 0,09 
StdDev. 
  
0,12 0,13 
  
0,13 0,19 
Source: author’s calculations 
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Table 6-5 - Markov Transiction Matrixes of the PDs under Wiener Process 
   BPI   BCP 
PD Bucket  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
[0%-10%]  0 9 17 18 19  0 41 53 48 47 
]10%-20%]  0 11 10 9 4  100 13 7 5 4 
]20%-30%]  0 16 4 2 3  0 9 1 8 1 
]30%-40%]  0 10 4 2 2  0 6 3 2 1 
]40%-50%]  100 7 4 4 0  0 6 3 0 1 
]50%-60%]  0 1 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 
]60%-70%]  0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 
]70%-80%]  0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 
]80%-90%]  0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 
]90%-100%]  0 46 61 65 72  0 25 33 37 46 
Source: author’s calculations 
 
Illustrations 15 - ROC curve  
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